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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
theory that such notice can be implied from unequivocal acts
of ownership.' On the other hand, the courts following the sub-
jective theory hold that there must be some real and tangible
assertion of ownership,8 rather than a mere quiet acquiescence,
the apparent theory being one can gain no title which he has
not asserted.
The basic concept of adverse possession involves acquisi-
tion of title by running of the Statute of Limitations as op-
posed to the true owners action of ejectment. North Dakota
however, appears to follow the majority view and apply the
objective theory that possession is presumed adverse and
claim of title is to be inferred from the fact of possession. The
alleged requirements of claim of title and hostility of posses-
sion mean only that the possessor, or those holding under him,
must use and enjoy the property continuously for the requir-
ed period as the average owner would use it without the true
owner's consent. Possession meeting these requirements is
in actual hostility to the true owner's rights irrespective of
the possessors actual state of mind or intent." The objective
theory is the most practical. The conduct of the adverse party
should govern and not the thoughts or reasons buried within
his mind. The true owner, by a very limited vigilance, may
protect his interest, and has an action in ejectnent for a cer-
tain statutory period.
RONALD YOUNG
ADVERSE POSSESSION - OIL AND GAS - ADVERSE POS-
SESSION OF OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES IN NORTH DAKOTA. One
Skarda owned land in North Dakota. In 1934 he mortgaged
the property to the land Bank Commissioner, who later as-
signed the mortgage to the Federal Farm Mortgage Corpora-
7. Butler v. Hines, 101 Ark 409, 142 S.W. 509 (1912); Bird v. Stark, 66
Mich. 654, 33 N.W. 754 (1887); Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335, 177 N.V.
171 (1920).
8. Evert v. Turner, 784 Iowa 1253, 169 N.W. 625 (1918); Hess v. Riedler.
117 Ala. 525, 23 So. 136 (1898); 'oltz v. Brokhage, 151 Neb. 216, 36 N.W.
2d 768 (1949).
9. See N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-04 (1961). "No action for the recovery of
real property or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, unless the
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of
the premises in question within twenty years before the commencement
of such action." N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-11 (1961).
10. See Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781, 42 S.E. 916 (1902), "while the in-
tension to claim title must be manifested, it need not be expressed."
11. Carpenter v. Coles, 75 Minn. 9, 77 N.W. 424 (1898) "This adverse in-
tent to oust the owner and possess for himself may be generally evidenced
by the character of the possession and the acts of ownerphip of the oc-
cupant."
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tion. In 1936-1937 Skarda conveyed royalty interests amount-
ing to 91/2% oil and gas underlying the property to various
grantees. In 1939 the mortgage was foreclosed by an action
in which the holders of royalty interests were not joined as
defendants. As a result of the foreclosure action the Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation received two Sheriff's Deeds cov-
ering the property. In 1942 plaintiff contracted to purchase
the property from the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation
and entered into possession. In 1943 the Federal Farm Mort-
gage Corporation conveyed the property to plaintiff by a deed
of limited warrant which excepted and reserved to the gran-
tor 50 percent of all oil, gas, and other minerals underlying the
land. Plaintiff cultivated the land and paid all taxes thereon
from 1942 to 1956. In 1949 plaintiff leased the land for oil and
gas purposes. Production of oil and gas commenced in 1953.
In 1955 plaintiff sued to quiet title, contending that defen-
dant's 9 percent royalty interest had been lost to plaintiff by
adverse possession. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
held that plaintiff's possession of the property was not in-
consistent with or adverse to the existence of defendant's
royalty interest. Hence defendant has not lost title to the
royalty interest by adverse possession. Yttredahl v. Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation, 104 N.W.2d 705 (N.D. 1960).
Assuming that usual requirements have been complied with,
it is generally held that title to subsurface minerals will at-
tach to subsurface minerals through adverse possession of the
'surface before any serverance of the mineral estate.' A per-
petual non-participating oil and gas royalty is an interest in
real property,' and severance of a mineral interest from the
surface estate creates two estates which are as distinct as if
they constituted two different parcels of land.' It has been
held or recognized in a large number of cases that after title
to the surface estate of land has been severed from the under-
lying mineral estate, title to the minerals cannot be acquired
1. Bremhoust v. Phillips Coal Co., 202 Ia. 1251, 211 N.W. 898 (1927);
Jones v. New Orleans & NER Co., 214 Miss. 804, 59 So. 2d 541 (1952); Rio
Bravo Oil Co. v. Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198, 158 S.W.2nd 293 (1942).
2. Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1947), Ulrich
v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 66 N.W.2d 397 (N.D. 1954); Gulf Oil Corp v.
Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59, 152 S.W.2d 711 (1941).
3. Jensen v. Sheker, 231 Ia. 240, 1 N.W.2d 262 (1941); Northwestern
Imp. Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W.2d 543 (1951); Ohio Oil Co.
v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947).
1961)
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
by adverse possession through possession of the surface es-
tate alone.'
In order to make a holding adverse there must be some
denial of the mineral owner's right or some assertion of a
claim inconsistent with his right.! If the surface owner exer-
cises control over the mineral rights, by actual operations' or
actual possession,' he may acquire title by adverse posses-
sion. Using the land for more agricultural purposes' or the
payment of taxes on the surface estate' will not entitle the sur-
face owner to claim title by adverse possession.
In the instant case the court in holding that adverse pos-
session to the severed royalty interests is not possible by
mere occupation of the severed surface estate, also stressed
the fact that the foreclosure action was defective due to the
failure to notify the respective royalty interest holders."0 The
same court held in Payne v. A. M. Fruh Company" that sev-
ered mineral interests may be acquired by mere possession of
the surface estate although the title to the surface estate was
acquired through an invalid tax deed.
It is submitted that with our court adhering to the theory
that severed mineral rights are to be considered as a separ-
ate and distinct estate," an enigmatic situation has resulted
by distinguishing between title acquired by an invalid tax
deed and that which is obtained through an invalid foreclosure
action.
Perhaps a reconciliation could be derived from the proce-
dure and effect of title acquired through a tax deed," and that
4. Foss v. Central Pacific R. Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 117, 49 P.2d 292 (1935);
Peterson v. Holland, 189 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947).
5. Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Oki. 249, 167 Pac. 468
(1917).
6. Cook v. Parley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So. 2d 352 (1943); Deruy v. Noah,
199 Okl. 230, 185 P.2d 189 (1947).
7. Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 54 So. 2d 562 (1951);
Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S.W.2d 390 (1929).
8. Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Oki. 249, 167 Pac. 468
(1917).
9. Buckner v. Wright, 218 Ark. 448, 236 S.W.2d 720 (1951); Saunders
V. Hornsby, 173 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); McCoy v. Lowrie, 42
Wash. 2d 24, 253 P.2d 415 (1953).
10. Yttredahl v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, 104 N.W.2d 705
(N.D. 1960).
11. 98 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1959).
12. Northwestern Imp. Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W.2d 543(1951).
13. Nelson v. Kloster, 68 N.D. 108, 277 N.W. 390 (1938), ". . . An inde-
pendent grant from a sovereign authority which gives a new complete and
paramont title . . .;- Baird v. Stubbins, 58 N.D. 351, 226 N.W. 529 (1929).
A tax deed has priority over a sheriff's deed even though the tax deed
was not recorded and the sheriff's deed was ... ;" See also Nystul v. Wal-
ler, 84 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1957); Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1956).
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resulting from a Sheriff's Deed" in an foreclosure action."
However, this does not result in a harmonizing reasoning, in-
asmuch as the severance of the title of the mineral estate from
the surface estate creates two distinct and separate parcels of
land, and it therefore naturally follows that title to one can-
not be adverse to the other regardless of the method by which
possession was authorized to the surface estate.
F. C. ROHRICH
CIVIL RIGHTS - ACTION FOR DAMAGES - PERSONAL LIABI-
LITY OF POLICE OFFICERS FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW. Defendants, thirteen Chicago
police officers, broke into plaintiff's home in the early morn-
ing forcing plaintiff and his family to stand naked in the liv-
ing room while conducting an extensive search of the pre-
mises. Plaintiff was then taken to the police station, as a sus-
pect, and held for ten hours of interrogation, was not allowed
to call an attorney or be taken before a magistrate, and was
subsequently released without criminal charges being prefer-
red against him. Alleging that the defendants, though lack-
ing a search warrant or warrant of arrest, acted "under color
of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages"
of Illinois and the City of Chicago, plaintiff sued defendants
for violation of his civil rights.' On writ of certiorari the Sa-
14. North Dakota Horse & Cattle Co. v. Serumgard, 17 N.D. 466, 117 N.W.
453 (1908); See N.D. Cent. Code § 32-10-09 (1961).
15. Knowlton v. Coye, 76 N.D. 478, 37 NW.2d 343 (1949), ... Conveys
to the grantee the same title which the mortgagor possessed at time of
execution of the mortgage .... ," Stewart v. Berg, 65 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.
1954), "... Does not invalidate the proceedings against unknown defen-
dants ... ;" See N.D. Cent. Code § 32-17-06 (1961).
1. The action was based on 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952),
which provides:
"ERvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
In, determining the civil liability of the defendants the Court was not pri-
marily concerned with whether they had acted in accqrdance with their
authority or had misused it, see Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), but was concerned With the narrower
issue of whether "Congress, in enacting (17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1952) ), meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position."
(81 Sup. Ct. 473, 476 (1961) ). Previous cases relative to this question have
been brought on the basis of 62 Stat. 683 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948),
which is the criminal counterpart of 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1952), and in supporting jurisdiction of the federal courts under 17 Stat.
13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952) in the immediate case, the Court relied
entirely on cases dealing with interpretation of the "under color of" clause
